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I. Introduction
In trade policy debates, the issue of unilateralism (i.e., the unilateral adoption of liberal
trade policies) versus reciprocity (where reciprocity of access is insisted on instead) is a long
standing one.1 The theoretical arguments used by proponents of either policy stance are
well known: Unilateralists rely upon the demonstration that in the absence of “distortions,”
free trade is eﬃcient, while a policy stance of reciprocity is theoretically supported by the
presence of “terms-of-trade” and political economy motivations in the economy.2
In contrast to much of this literature, which has considered these two approaches to trade
liberalization independently of each other, it is the goal of this paper to study the possi-
ble causal interaction between unilateral and reciprocal trade liberalization. Speciﬁcally, we
are interested in examining the question of whether unilateral trade liberalization by one
country could induce reciprocal liberalization by its partner in the absence of any commu-
nication or negotiation between these two countries. The theoretical platform that we use
to investigate this point is the popular construct of Grossman and Helpman (1994), where
tariﬀs are determined by the interaction between competing domestic lobbying groups and
1Thus, one may consider the recent policy debates in the United States or go back a hundred and ﬁfty
years and examine the policy discussions preceding England’s famous unilateral repeal of its Corn Laws
to ﬁnd free traders and reciprotarians actively pitted against each other. For an excellent discussion of
debates in nineteenth century England between “unilateralists” and “reciprotarians” and of parallels with
late twentieth century US, see Bhagwati and Irwin (1987).
2Thus, for instance, Mayer (1981) showed that in the presence of terms of trade motivations for tariﬀs,
international negotiations could lead to a better outcome than the non-cooperative Nash outcome derived
earlier by Johnson (1956). Equally, political economy inﬂuences have been considered in models explaining
agreed-upon reciprocal trade liberalization in the work of Mayer (1984a), Hillman and Moser (1996) and
Bagwell and Staiger (1998), among others.
1the government,3 and where the government’s objective function itself includes political con-
tributions from organized lobbies and also aggregate welfare. An important feature of our
analysis is that formation of organized lobbies itself is treated as being endogenous, as in
Mitra (1999).4 In this context, it is this paper’s central ﬁnding that unilateral tariﬀ liberal-
ization by one country, by altering the political economy equilibrium in the partner country,
may indeed result in reciprocal tariﬀ reduction by the partner. We believe that this result
carries interesting normative implications: It stands in stark contrast to the conventional
policy wisdom on this matter regarding the use of (the threat of) one’s trade barriers to
remove those of others - as exempliﬁed by the United States’ recent use of the “Super-301”
provision to “retaliate” by raising trade barriers against countries whose trade barriers are
perceived as unreasonable.5
The linkage between unilateralism and reciprocal liberalization that we have in mind is as
follows: Consider a small open economy trading with a large partner. Further, to ﬁx ideas,
consider an initial situation in which the import-competing sector in the small country is
3Thus we take the “political-economy”approach, following the pioneering work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman
(1976) and Becker (1983) in modeling “pressure-groups” in general and the work of Findlay and Wellisz
(1982), Hillman (1982), Bhagwati and Feenstra (1982), Mayer (1984b), Hillman and Ursprung (1988), Magee,
Brock and Young (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (1994), in considering explicitly political-economy
considerations (often the impact of lobbies) in determining trade policy outcomes. Recent work in this
area includes Helpman and Persson (1998), which looks at the interaction between lobbying and legislative
bargaining and the implications of such an interaction for the determination of economic policy, Grossman
and Helpman (1995a and 1995b) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). Helpman (1995) and Rodrik (1995)
both provide excellent surveys of recent developments.
4While we make substantial use of the theoretical structures of both these papers to make our point, it
should be clear that our work diﬀers signiﬁcantly in motivation and spirit from both these earlier papers,
neither of which is concerned with the central issue that motivates the present analysis - the possible causal
connection between unilateral liberalization and its reciprocation by a partner country and the normative
implications of this interaction.
5Our results should not be read as saying, however, that there isn’t value to negotiation or the requirement
of reciprocity in trade negotiations. We are simply suggesting that taking a more sophisticated view of
the underlying politics in one’s trading partners suggests a stronger role for unilateralism than previously
emphasized in the theoretical literature. On the merits of reciprocity rules, see, for instance, the recent and
important paper by Bagwell and Staiger (1998).
2represented by an organized lobby but the exportables sector is not (due to a ﬁxed cost
requirement faced by this sector which in this initial equilibrium exceeds the beneﬁts it
could get from the formation of the lobby). Consequently, its (Grossman-Helpman) trade
policy vector (determined by lobbying by the import-competing lobby and the government
preferences) is characterized by import tariﬀs (which raise the lobby’s proﬁts) and export
taxes (which lower the lobby’s cost of consuming the exportable good).6 In this context,
unilateral liberalization by the large partner country can be shown to generally increase the
incentives for the formation of an export lobby in the small country. This happens for two
reasons: First, a higher world price of the exportable good (resulting from this liberalization)
makes the existing trade policy vector more costly for the export lobby. Secondly, at higher
export prices (in the absence of an export lobby) the import-competing lobby has incentives
to lobby for a trade policy vector even more biased against the exporting lobby - further
raising the incentives for formation of the export lobby. Once formed, this export lobby then
competes eﬀectively with the import-competing lobby to oppose the orientation of existing
trade policies (i.e., to reduce domestic tariﬀs and export taxes). Unilateral liberalization by
one country therefore has a “strategic” eﬀect on the relevant groups in the partner country
so that freer trade is the outcome.7
Several additional points relating to the empirical validity of our results and their connection
with the rest of the theoretical literature may be made here:
6The export tax derived in the Grossman-Helpman model should not be taken literally. As is well known,
in multi-sector general equilibrium models with perfect competition, the imposition of import taxes on all
imports is itself equivalent to export taxes being imposed on all exports at the same ad valorem rate (Lerner
symmetry). Further, if intermediates are used in production (speciﬁcally if the importable is used in the
production of the exportable good), it should be clear to see that the import tax itself acts as a tax on the
exportable sector.
7This causal link is similar to the one suggested informally by Bhagwati (1990) that “concessions to the
foreign exporters,” through a reduction in home country tariﬀs, “may create new interests that counter-
balance the interests that oppose trade liberalization” there. See also the related and important work of
McLaren (1997, 1999), which variously analyzes the implications of ﬁxed and sunk investment by forward-
looking ﬁrms on the trade policy choices of domestic and foreign governments.
3First, we should note that the type of result demonstrated in the paper is indeed possible
in the classic Johnson (1956) analysis of optimal tariﬀs if the tariﬀ reaction functions there
are upward sloping. There too, a unilateral tariﬀ reduction by one country would result
in tariﬀ reductions by the partner (again, if the partner’s tariﬀ reaction function is upward
sloping). However, it should be clear that our analysis diﬀers in signiﬁcant theoretical
(and ﬁnally empirically relevant) ways from the Johnsonian analysis. In our framework, a
unilateral liberalization by a country would aﬀect even a “small” country’s trade policies,
whereas in the Johnsonian analysis, a small open economy keeps its tariﬀs ﬁxed at zero -
independently of the tariﬀs imposed by the large partner country. Thus, in our framework,
unilateralism may be reciprocated even in the absence of terms of trade motivations for the
partner - an outcome that is not possible in the Johnsonian framework. Furthermore, in
Johnson’s analysis, upward sloping reaction functions can only be derived if partner export
supply elasticities are falling in partner country tariﬀs. Our results do not depend upon this
monotonic elasticity relationship (whose empirical validity itself may be questioned - indeed
most textbook treatments normally consider the opposite case - that of downward sloping
reaction functions - while admitting the theoretical possibility of upward slopes). In any
event, these are not mutually exclusive theories. Johnson’s upward sloping reaction functions
(even if empirically valid) do not interfere with the mechanisms suggested in this paper.
Which theory is of greater relevance is an empirical question whose detailed consideration is
outside of the scope of this paper.
Second, without making a strong empirical claim, we should note that the prediction of our
model is consistent with a few major episodes of unilateral trade liberalization which are well
known in the history of international economic relations.8 As Coates and Ludema (1997)
8Separately, the role of sunk costs in political organization and the endogenous formation of lobbies in
response to improved economic incentives to do so has been analyzed recently in the empirical investigation
of the 1945 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) by Irwin and Kroszner (1997).
4argue, these include the unilateral repeal of England’s Corn Laws in the mid-nineteenth
century, “after decades of attempts to negotiate lower tariﬀs with its trading partners” and
the more recent example of the United States, which, after the end of the Second World War
sponsored the General Agreement on Trade and Tariﬀs (GATT) and engaged subsequently
in major tariﬀ reductions “without requiring substantive reciprocity from its major trading
partners.” “Waves of liberalization” by trading partners followed both these episodes. In the
period immediately after England’s repeal of its Corn laws, numerous countries followed suit
- with unilateral trade reforms of their own or with bilateral tariﬀ agreements with England.
Equally, the major trading partners of the United States reduced their trade barriers in
the subsequent period leading upto the 1970s.9 In this context, the recent experiences of
many developing countries also seem relevant. Following trade barrier reductions by full-
obligation (i.e., developed country) GATT members in the several GATT rounds, there have
been dramatic reductions of trade barriers by many developing countries which were exempt
from the obligation to reciprocate by the articles (speciﬁcally, Article XVIII) of the GATT.10
This is roughly consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model: Unilateralism may
be reciprocated even in the absence of a formal obligation to do so.
We should note also the similarity in motivation of our work with that of Coates and Ludema
(1997), who study the impact of unilateral tariﬀ reduction on negotiation outcomes (specif-
ically the likelihood of success of achieving bilateral agreements in the presence of the “po-
litical risk” of domestic opposition to trade agreements) and argue that unilateral trade
9It is not our intention here to dispute any other explanations provided by the economic history literature
on this matter. Having pointed to a particular channel which we believe to be theoretically interesting and
empirically plausible, we leave its empirical validity in particular historical contexts as a topic for future
research. See Coates and Ludema (1997) and Kindleberger (1975, 1977) for excellent discussions of the
explanations provided by economic historians on this issue.
10We should note here that the relevance of interest groups in trade policy determination in developing
countries, as assumed in the theoretical framework we use in this paper, has been established in a number
of recent empirical papers, including deMelo, Grether and Olarreaga (2001) and Mitra, Thomakos and
Ulubasoglu (2002).
5liberalization may be the optimal policy for a large country. In their framework, “unilateral
liberalization acts as insurance” by providing a “risk-sharing” role. Unilateral tariﬀ reduc-
tion lowers the political stakes associated with trade liberalization in the foreign country,
thereby lowering the overall political cost of reaching and implementing trade agreements
and increasing the probability of successful agreements.
To sum up, we believe the contribution of the paper to be three-fold: It is among the ﬁrst
formal analyses of the interaction between unilateralism and reciprocal liberalization that
we are aware of. Second, in studying this interaction it articulates channels through which
unilateralism could lead to the organization of export interests in partner countries and
thus induce reciprocity - a result which we believe holds interesting normative implications.
Finally, in serving as a potential explanation for some well-known historical episodes of trade
reform that we have mentioned, we believe that our paper has some positive signiﬁcance as
well.
Before proceeding with the formal model, we should note a point regarding the modeling
strategy here: While we treat explicitly the formation of lobbies and tariﬀs in the “small”
economy, the tariﬀ reduction in the large economy is modeled as being exogenous (i.e., the
level of the tariﬀ imposed by the large open economy is taken as given by agents in the small
country). This is done for analytical convenience since it appears to us to be the simplest
framework within which to communicate the central idea of the paper - i.e., that there exist
channels through which tariﬀ reductions in one country (however they come about) could
lead to reciprocal tariﬀ reductions by its partners. However, even taking this assumption of
“exogenous tariﬀ reduction” literally, several examples may be oﬀered in justiﬁcation: Thus,
for example, the model may be interpreted as representing a situation in which developed
country GATT members negotiate tariﬀ reductions amongst themselves and bind their tariﬀs
at the end of such negotiations. Developing country members are beneﬁciaries of these tariﬀ
6reductions due to the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle of the GATT, but may not
be under full obligation to reciprocate (due to Article XVIII of the GATT). The possible
reciprocity (in the form of tariﬀ reductions by the developing countries, for instance) that
may nonetheless be induced by such tariﬀ reductions by developed countries is what this
model studies. An alternate interpretation is to think of the model as studying the eﬀects
on partner countries of tariﬀ reductions that may occur in certain countries due to regime
shifts involving ideological changes (the ascension of committed free-traders into political
power, for instance). A third interpretation is to think of the model as studying the impact
of trade policy changes undertaken by some countries due to conditionality imposed on them
by international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund as part of a larger scheme
to restructure the economy. In each of these cases, one may argue that agents in the partner
countries (i.e., lobbies) take the tariﬀ changes as being given rather than being endogenous
to their own actions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II outlines the basic model describing
endowments, technology and preferences in a small economy that is involved in trade with
a “large” partner. Section III discusses the endogenous formation of lobbies and trade
policy in the small country and derives the initial equilibrium. Section IV demonstrates the
scope for reciprocal liberalization by the small country when tariﬀs are liberalized by its
large partner. To examine the welfare impact on the large unilaterally liberalizing country,
Section V extends the analysis to the case where the large country trades with a large number
of small open economies. Section VI derives optimal tariﬀs - both when the large country
takes the structure of lobbies in these small economies as being ﬁxed and when alternately
it takes into account the impact that it may have in inﬂuencing the structure of lobbies
and consequently trade policy in its partner countries. Section VII describes the results of
simulation analysis conducted with a view to exploring the implications of our framework
under circumstances (i.e., initial conditions) other than those we focus on in the main section
7of the paper. Section VIII concludes.
II. The Model
Consider a small open economy producing a numeraire good z with Ricardian technology
and two non-numeraire goods (an import-competing and an exportable good), xm and xe,11
each requiring a diﬀerent kind of factor of production speciﬁc to that good and labor for
their production. Individuals in this economy are assumed to have identical preferences with
their utility functions taking the following form:




where cz is consumption of the numeraire good, cxi is consumption of good xi and ui(cxi)
denotes the sub-utility derived from the consumption of the ith non numeraire good (u0 > 0
and u00 < 0). Consumers then solve the following optimization problem:
(1) max
cz,cxi






picxi + cz = E
where E is total income and where pm and pe denote the domestic prices of these two
goods (the world price of goods xi is assumed to be exogenously given at p∗
i ).
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we have demand for the non-numeraire goods given by:
cxi = di(pi)
where d(.) is the inverse of u0(.).
11As is standard in the literature, it is assumed that this numeraire good is freely traded between countries
- indeed it is exchanges of this numeraire good that serve to settle the balance of trade. Thus, this good may
be imported or exported by any country based on its balance of trade in the remaining goods. Regardless, we
shall refer to this good as simply the “numeraire” good and use the terms importable good and exportable
good to refer exclusively to the goods xm and xe respectively.
8The demand for the numeraire good, in turn, is given by




Given our assumption regarding the form of the utility function, the indirect utility function
is given by
ν(p,E)=E + σ(p), (3)









As stated earlier, good z is manufactured using labor alone under constant returns to scale
(CRS). We set the input-output coeﬃcient equal to one by choice of units (i.e., z = Lz), so
that the wage rate w = 1 in a competitive equilibrium. The output of each non-numeraire
good is given by the following production function
xi = Fi(Ki,L i) (5)
where Ki is the sector speciﬁc factor used in the production of the ith good and Li is
the amount of labor used in the ith good. Fi(.) is assumed to be CRS and subject to
diminishing returns to each factor.




where πi(pi) is the proﬁt function and gives the total reward to Ki.12
12It can easily be shown that π00
i (pi) > 0, i.e., the proﬁt function is convex with respect to price - a
property that we will use later in deriving our results.
9Individual income in this economy is augmented by lump-sum (and uniform) redistribution of
income derived from trade taxes and subsidies.13 The net revenue from taxes and subsidies,






i)[di(pi) − (1/N)xi(pi)] (7)
where N is the total population and p∗
i denotes the world price of good i.
Thus, if lh represents individual h’s endowment of labor and if sh
i denotes its share of the








i πi(pi)+τ(p) h =1 ,2...N. (8)









To get to endogenous determination of tariﬀs and lobbies, we make some simplifying as-
sumptions regarding the structure of endowments and ownership of speciﬁc factors in this
economy. First, we assume that each individual in the economy is endowed with exactly l
units of labor. Further, we assume that each individual owns only one type of speciﬁc factor
and that owners of any particular type of speciﬁc factor are symmetric (that is, they own
identical amounts of that speciﬁc factor). Letting θ denote the fraction of the population
that owns the kind of speciﬁc factor used in the production of the importable and 1 − θ
denote the proportion of population that owns the other speciﬁc factor,14 we have the total
13Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that the only policy instruments available to
politicians are trade taxes and subsidies. For some interesting implications of the presence of other policy
instruments such as consumption and production taxes and subsidies at the disposal of the government in
the presence of exogenously determined lobbies, see Dixit (1996).
14Thus, we assume that the entire population owns some speciﬁc factor. As will quickly become evident,








θ when i = m
1 − θ when i = e
III. Determination of the Structure of Lobbies and Protection
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government is assumed to care about the total
level of political contributions that it may receive and about aggregate well-being. The
government values contributions because they can be used to ﬁnance campaign spending or
provide other direct beneﬁts to oﬃce holders. Social welfare is of concern to the government
since voters would more likely re-elect a government that has delivered a high standard of







where Λ is the set of organized interest groups (lobbies), ΩG(p) is the objective function
of the government, ΩA(p), is aggregate gross social welfare,15 Ci(p) is the contribution
schedule of the ith lobby and a is the weight the government attaches to aggregate social
this delivers strong results with changing lobby structure. However, we should note that the qualitative
spirit of our results is preserved even with greater concentration of ownership of speciﬁc factors, i.e., if
αe + αm < 1. Further, even at very high levels of concentration of ownership of factors, i.e., with αe + αm
approaching zero, the qualitative spirit of our results is maintained if we include and consider other features -
such as intermediate inputs which are importables or the potential formation of consumer lobbies. Including
either of these in the model would restore the general equilibrium linkages that break down with very high
concentration of factor ownership and preserve the spirit of our results.
15Since this paper is eventually concerned with causes and consequences of lobby formation, we shall
shortly introduce additional notation in the form of subscripts attached to Ω that denote which lobbies are
operational at any given time.
11welfare relative to political contributions. Clearly, the higher is a, the higher its concern for
social welfare relative to its aﬃnity for political contributions.
We are interested in the political equilibrium of the following three-stage non-cooperative
game. In the ﬁrst stage, speciﬁc factor owners in a sector decide whether to contribute to
the ﬁnancing of the ﬁxed and sunk costs (deﬁned in labor terms) of forming an organized
lobby. This ﬁxed cost consists of the costs of forming an organization, establishing links
with politicians, hiring professional lobbyists, building a communications network among
members, designing a scheme of punishments for defaulting members, etc. Forming a lobby
can also be one way of getting closer to the government, so that political inﬂuence can be ex-
ercised on government’s decision making. A lobby can be considered to be an organizational
set up to reduce transactions costs in lobbying activity, coordinate campaign contributions
and communicate political “oﬀers” to the politicians. In sectors without lobbies, the indi-
vidual owners consider themselves too small to communicate their oﬀers or persuade the
government to formulate economic policy one way or the other, since the transactions costs
for these to be done at the level of the individual may be very high.
In the second stage, lobbies choose their political contribution schedules. As in Grossman
and Helpman (1994), it is assumed that each organized industry provides the government
with a contribution schedule that truthfully reveals its preferences taking into account the
government’s objective function. Finally, in the third stage, the government sets trade policy
to maximize a weighted sum of political contributions and overall social welfare.
The problem is solved by working backwards, i.e., by starting from the third stage. Here,









where P is the set of domestic price vectors from which the government may choose. As
already noted, attention in this paper is restricted to equilibria that lie in the interior of P.
In the prior stage, lobbies are assumed to choose truthful contribution schedules. The
schedule for each lobby i ∈ Λ is given by
Ci(p)=max(0,Ωi(p) − bi)
where the scalars bi’s (the net welfare anchors for the diﬀerent lobby groups) are determined
in equilibrium. As in Grossman and Helpman, we focus on equilibria where lobbies make
positive contributions. In other words, in the neighborhood of the equilibrium,
Ci(p)=Ω
i(p) − bi. (12)















The solution to this maximization problem yields (Grossman and Helpman (1994)) the










where γ is the proportion of the population that belongs to any organized lobby in equi-
librium, µi and ￿i denote the ratio of imports to domestic production and the absolute
16The expressions simply represent the Grossman-Helpman (1994)“modiﬁed Ramsey rule.”
13value of the price elasticity of import demand respectively, if i = m, and denote the ratio of
exports to domestic production of the exportable and the absolute value of the elasticity of
export supply if i = e instead. Ii is an indicator variable which takes a value of one if the
ith sector is organized and zero otherwise.
The immediate implication of (14) is that if both the exporting and importing sector in our
framework are organized, we have free trade - since γ =1a n dIi takes on the value of one
for both sectors. This can be seen intuitively from (13). We know that when both lobbies
are formed, the government is simply maximizing the weighted sum of overall welfare on the
one hand and the sum of the surplus that accrues to each group on the other. This is simply
a multiple of overall welfare anyway - which is maximized with free trade.
We are interested in understanding what the implications are of a reduction in tariﬀs by
a large partner country on the equilibrium structure of tariﬀ protection in this country.
In this context, an initial equilibrium in which the small country is already at free trade is
uninteresting. Thus, to begin with, we assume that at least one sector is organized. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that only the import-competing sector is organized to begin
with.17 Equation (14) gives us then that the trade regime is one that favors the import
competing sector and in which the exporting sector is eﬀectively taxed. The import tariﬀ,










17As we discuss in the next section, the spirit of our theoretical results is unaﬀected if we start instead
with only the exporting lobby being organized. However, as Rodrik (1995) notes, it is a stylized fact that
the vast majority of trade regimes that were liberalized in the recent years started with regimes in which the
import competing sector enjoyed signiﬁcant protection. Thus, we present our analysis under the maintained










Note that here, the tariﬀ on imports, tm, is positive and the protection to the export sector,





We now go back to the ﬁrst stage and analyze conditions under which we may have lobby
formation (of the export lobby) itself, taking the import sector as organized.19 To save on
notation, for the present analysis, we set (without any loss of generality) the world price
of the importable good to be one.20 We also let p∗
e = p∗. Thus, p∗ now denotes the world
relative price of the exportable. In this context, members of the exportable group decide
whether to form a lobby or remain unorganized. To form the lobby, they face a ﬁxed labor
cost denoted by F. Nash interaction among group members is assumed in their contribution
decisions towards the provision of the ﬁxed labor cost of lobby formation. However, once the
lobby is formed, it is assumed here that the lobby machinery can enforce perfect coordination
among the members of that group in the collection of political contributions, i.e., given the
symmetry of capital ownership by members within a group, the lobby machinery can enforce
collection of equal amounts of political contributions from each capitalist in the sector. To
compare the costs and beneﬁts of lobby formation, we set up some additional notation as
18Henceforth when we talk of a higher tax, we mean a higher absolute value.
19Again, it is straightforward to do a similar analysis of the incentives for the import- competing sector
to organize taking the export sector as organized. This is discussed in greater detail at the end of Section
IV, where we discuss the implications of a unilateral liberalization by the partner on the net beneﬁt from
organizing for any group, taking the other group as organized.
20This is, of course, consistent with the small country assumption made here. In section V, where we
consider a large country and a large number of small open economies instead, we allow the world price of
the importable good to vary.
15promised: Using “˜” to denote equilibrium values, we let ˜ Ωk
i,j denote equilibrium gross
welfare of the kth sector with both lobbies in place, ˜ Ωk
i denote its equilibrium gross welfare
with only the ith lobby in place and ˜ Ωk denote its equilibrium gross welfare with no lobbies
in place. Finally, we let ˜ C denote the export lobby’s equilibrium political contribution.
Now, depending upon the magnitude of the ﬁxed costs relative to the beneﬁts of lobby
formation, there are three possibilities:
1. The beneﬁt to any one individual within the exportable lobby exceeds the cost of forming
the lobby. Here, contributing to the full ﬁnancing of the ﬁxed cost F is the only Nash
equilibrium outcome among the group members, i.e., a lobby is always formed when,
(˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C)/(1 − θ)N>F .
2. Alternately, the cost of lobby formation exceeds the beneﬁt to any one individual but is
less than the total beneﬁt to the lobby, i.e.,
˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C>F>(˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C)/(1 − θ)N
In this situation, there are two possible Nash equilibrium outcomes – either there is no
contribution to the provision of the lobby or the ﬁxed cost is fully ﬁnanced. We assume that
pre-play communication can take place. For example, when capitalists in an industry feel
that they are going to beneﬁt from forming a lobby, they start communicating with each other
– write letters, make phone calls, etc. Hence, one can use some popular communication based
reﬁnements here. The better equilibrium for the group (i.e., the lobby is formed) satisﬁes the
conditions for the three popular communication based reﬁnements – coalition proof Nash,
strong Nash and the Pareto-dominance reﬁnement, and hence, group coordination becomes
the likely equilibrium outcome.21
21Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) look at an important class of “non-cooperative” environments
163. The cost of forming the lobby exceeds the beneﬁt of lobby formation to the group, i.e.,
˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C<F .
The Nash equilibrium outcome is obviously “not providing the lobby” since the total beneﬁt
is less than the total ﬁxed costs. From the analysis of the above three cases, the conclusion
that emerges is that a lobby is formed under the following condition:
˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C>F . (16)
Having described the initial equilibrium that we focus on and having derived conditions
under which an (initially non-existent) export lobby may be formed, we proceed to analyze
the impact of unilateral trade reform on this initial equilibrium.
IV. Unilateral Tariﬀ Liberalization, Terms of Trade Changes and
Endogenous Lobby Formation
We are interested in how a unilateral tariﬀ reduction by a large partner country (leading to
an improvement in the export price p∗ faced by the “small” home country) may aﬀect the
initial equilibrium. In particular we are interested in how this may aﬀect the equilibrium
structure of lobbies and ﬁnally the equilibrium structure of tariﬀs.
where players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. They introduce a
reﬁnement of the Nash set, the concept of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium. An agreement is coalition-proof
if and only if it is Pareto eﬃcient within the class of self-enforcing agreements. In turn, an agreement is
self-enforcing if and only if no proper subset (coalition) of players, taking the actions of its complement as
ﬁxed, can agree to deviate in a way that makes all its members better oﬀ. A more demanding reﬁnement
is the strong Nash reﬁnement [Aumann (1959)] which requires that no coalition (including the whole set),
taking the actions of its complement as given, can cooperatively deviate in a way that beneﬁts all of its
members. The Pareto dominance reﬁnement requires that the Nash equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient among
all possible Nash equilibria.
17To get to this, however, we need to develop a little additional notation. Thus, we let NB
represent net beneﬁt from lobby formation for the exportable sector. NB is net of political
contributions, but gross of ﬁxed costs. This net beneﬁt is therefore given by
NB = ˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − ˜ C (17)
With truthful contributions, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the equilibrium contribu-




m,e − ˜ be(p
∗) (18)
where ˜ be is the net (of contributions) welfare or payoﬀ anchor (determined in equilibrium) of
the contribution schedule of the exportable group when organized. Note that this is diﬀerent
from the net beneﬁt (gross of ﬁxed costs) from lobby formation, NB, which is the diﬀerence
between the net payoﬀ ˜ be = ˜ Ωe
m,e − ˜ C received as an organized group and the net payoﬀ
˜ Ωe
m as an unorganized group. Note also that the endogeneity of trade taxes and subsidies
and thus domestic prices implies that equilibrium values of group welfare and contributions
can now be written as functions of only the world price of the exportable, rather than as
functions of domestic prices and trade taxes.
Importantly, with truthful contributions, any lobby when formed will have to pay the gov-
ernment an amount that makes it indiﬀerent between treating that lobby as organized and
treating it as unorganized, given the contribution schedule of the other lobbies.22 Thus,
from (14), we know that the export lobby should compensate the government for the reduc-
tion in the import lobby’s welfare due to its entry and for changes in overall social welfare.
Therefore, the contribution of the export lobby is given by:
˜ C = ˜ Ω
m
m − ˜ Ω
m
m,e + a(˜ Ω
A
m − ˜ Ω
A
m,e) (19)
22This is analogous to the celebrated Clark-Groves mechanism. See Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for a
discussion.
18where the superscript “A” stands for aggregate as before. We can now state our ﬁrst propo-
sition:
Proposition 1:
With a pre-existing import-competing lobby, the net beneﬁt to the exporting sector
from the formation of an export lobby (gross of ﬁxed costs) is proportional to
the sum of the deadweight losses created (relative to the free trade level) in the
importable and the exportable sectors by the equilibrium trade policies that result
when only the import-competing sector is organized.
This is seen by substituting (19) into (17). The net beneﬁt to the export lobby from lobby
formation can then be written as:
NB = ˜ Ω
e
m,e − ˜ Ω
e
m − [(˜ Ω
m




m − ˜ Ω
A
m,e)] = (a + 1)(˜ Ω
A
m,e − ˜ Ω
A
m) (20)
where the second equality derives from our assumption that all members of society own at
least one speciﬁc factor. (20) tells us that the net beneﬁt from lobby formation can simply be
expressed in terms of the change in aggregate welfare due to the formation of the lobby. Since
our utility functions are quasi-linear, aggregate change in welfare can simply be expressed in
terms of surplus changes. The above expression for net beneﬁt can then be usefully modiﬁed
as follows:
NB =( a + 1)(∆m +∆ e) (21)
where ∆m and ∆e are the dead weight losses created in the importable and exportable
sector respectively when only the importable sector is organized relative to when both lobbies
are organized (i.e., the free trade level). This proves our proposition.
Our assumption regarding the initial equilibrium is equivalent to assuming that at the initial
level of world prices, NB <F, that is, that the net beneﬁt from lobby formation is less than
19the ﬁxed cost of lobby formation and so the lobby does not form. The particular exercise
that we wish to undertake relates to the eﬀects of unilateral liberalization by a large partner
country. As such, this would raise the world price of the small country’s exportable good. To
see how this may aﬀect the incentives for lobby formation, we take the derivative of the above
expression with respect to p∗. Then, under the additional suﬃcient assumption (which we
discuss shortly) that Es(.)00 ≥ 0 where Es is export supply from the small country, we have
our second proposition:
Proposition 2
The net beneﬁt from lobby formation to the exporting sector, NB, is increasing
in the world price of the exportable, p∗.
Noting that the deadweight loss in the import competing sector, ∆m, does not depend upon
p∗, and noting that the deadweight loss in the other sector can simply be expressed as a
function of the world price of the exportable and the absolute value of the per unit tax on
the exportable, T = |p∗te|, we have;
dNB
dp∗ =( a +1 )
d∆e























 > 0 (22)
(22) has three components on the right hand side which need to be signed:
The ﬁrst component is the change in the dead weight loss in the exportable sector due to an
increase in the absolute value of the tax. It is straightforward to see that this is positive.
The second component is the change in the absolute value of the export tax for a given
change in international export prices. This is positive as well. While we save a formal proof
20for the Appendix A.1. we can state the intuition here: The reason that T is increasing in p∗
is that at a high world price for the exportable, the gain to the organized group from a given
reduction in the price of the exportable good is higher. This leads to more vigorous lobbying
by the importable sector for a higher per-unit export tax (since they are consumers of this
good). In turn, this leads to a higher per-unit export tax. This can be seen clearly in Figure
I which represents changes in surplus and tariﬀ revenues at two diﬀerent levels of the world
price of the exportable, p∗, holding the per unit tax, T, ﬁxed. Note ﬁrst that changes in p∗
aﬀect the import-competing sector through changes in consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenues
(i.e, area ABCD minus the two Harberger triangles). Note further that change in surplus to
this sector is a ﬁxed proportion (i.e., the ratio θ) of the overall change (since all individuals
in this economy consume goods in identical fashion and get the same share of tax revenues).
Thus, at a higher p∗, for a given T, the change in surplus overall is higher (since A’B’C’D’
> ABCD and the Harberger triangles are the same area). This implies a higher change in
surplus to the import lobby. Thus there is a greater incentive to lobby for a higher export
tax, which results in a higher per unit export tax, T, in equilibrium.23
As we show in Appendix A.2., the third term ∂∆e
∂p∗ is always ≥ 0i fE
00
s ≥ 0, a condition that
we assume here but that can be argued to be satisﬁed under fairly general conditions. To
see this we note ﬁrst that the condition holds for the linear supply and demand case where,
E
00
s = 0. Further, as we show in Appendix A.3., with constant export supply elasticities, for
E
00
s > 0, we need that ￿s > 1 where ￿s denotes export supply elasticity. As we argue further
in Appendix A.3., the condition that ￿s > 1 itself should be satisﬁed for a very wide range
23We should point out that this holds even under alternate assumptions regarding tariﬀ revenue redistrib-
ution. To see this assume that the government holds onto tariﬀ revenue instead of redistributing it uniformly
to individuals. Now, with an increase in the world price of the exportable, the import-competing sector by
itself would have less reason to lobby for an export tax (since its consumer surplus gain from such a tax on
the margin is smaller). However, if it is assumed that the government places a premium on tariﬀ revenues,
then the government has a strong motivation to raise the export tax. On balance, with a strong enough
emphasis on tax revenues placed by the government, the export tax would go up.
21of domestic supply and demand elasticities.24 Conditions under which E
00
s ≥ 0 holds even
with non-constant export supply elasticities are discussed in Appendix A.3. as well.
Combining the three eﬀects, we have that,
dNB
dp∗ > 0
meaning that the net beneﬁts to the export sector of forming an export lobby increase in
p∗. This too can be seen from Figure I. Raising p∗, holding T ﬁxed, the export lobby sees
a larger reduction in producer surplus ( A’B’C’D’ instead of ABCD) thereby increasing the
incentive of the export lobby to form a lobby and lobby against the tax. Further, as we have
already explained, the per-unit export tax increases as p∗ goes up, increasing the incentive




we let p∗ = p solve the following equation:
NB(p
∗)=F. (23)
This allows us to state our third Proposition:
Proposition 3
When tariﬀ reductions by the unilaterally liberalizing large country raise the world
price25 of the small country’s exportable (p∗) beyond p, this unilateralism is recip-
24We should note here that even if we abandon our assumption regarding the curvature of the export
supply function and it turns out to have the opposite sign (i.e., E
00
s < 0), NB would be increasing in p∗
if the product of the ﬁrst and second terms (both unambiguously positive) dominates.
25With the speciﬁc assumptions on technology and preferences made here for the small country (and under
identical assumptions for the large country), it is easy to show that we do not encounter the “Lerner case”
and that a tariﬀ reduction by the large country does increase the price of the small country’s exportable in
world markets.
22rocated: the small partner country moves to free trade.
This follows directly from equation (22) and equation (23). From these, we know that when
p∗ ≥ p, the exportable sector gets organized. Now with both export and import sectors
organized, there is free trade.26
This establishes our primary result that unilateral liberalization by a large partner country
within this framework will induce reciprocal liberalization.27 Proﬁles of the net beneﬁt from
lobby formation and the per unit trade taxes as functions of p∗ are illustrated in Figure II.
As shown there, once the export price, p∗, rises above the threshold level, i.e., once p∗ ≥ p,
we have free trade.28
It is also useful to interpret the political-economy mechanism just stated in terms of how the
welfare level of the exportable group varies with the world price of the exportable diﬀerently
when this group is organized than when it is not. Figure III illustrates (see Appendix A.4. for
the mathematical derivations) that an increase in the world price of the exportable increases
welfare of the exportable group whether it is organized or unorganized. Thus, the welfare
26Note, interestingly, that this move towards free trade need not always be welfare improving for the
partner country. Thus, imagine that the initial world price of the exportable is just below p and that
unilateral liberalization by the large country raises it to a level just above p, so that NB just exceeds F.
We know that the small country’s export lobby would now form and in doing so will undertake a ﬁxed
resource cost of F. Gross aggregate welfare goes up by (∆m +∆ e). However, the ﬁxed cost would only be
slightly below the net beneﬁt to the export lobby which is given by NB =( a+1)(∆m +∆ e) and is thefeore
greater than (∆m +∆ e). Aggregate net welfare is thus lowered. However, our focus is, of course, on the
large country’s incentives to lower its tariﬀs unilaterally and on the positive analysis of the small country’s
response - an issue that we take up in detail in the next section.
27Note that in the model, unilateral liberalization by one country results in reciprocity by the partner
country through changes in the “demand” for protection in the partner country. However, one could interpret
this as occurring through a change in the “supply” of protection instead. Speciﬁcally, with the formation of
the export lobby, the ﬁnal maximand of the “supplier” of protection, the government, changes - since it now
takes into account contributions by this lobby as well. One could therefore think of this, loosely, as being
an endogenous change in preferences of the supplier of the protection.
28As can also be seen in Figure II, when p∗ is below the threshold level, the per unit export tax is rising
with p∗ - just as we have discussed earlier.
23levels are shown with positive slopes. Note that the welfare level of the exportable group
when organized (net of political contributions but gross of the ﬁxed cost of lobby formation)
is higher than when it is not organized. Note also that NB increasing in p∗ implies that the
welfare locus when unorganized has ﬂatter slope - implying, in turn, with large enough ﬁxed
costs, some point of intersection with the welfare locus when organized (net of both ﬁxed
costs and political contributions). The price at which this takes place is, again, p. Beyond
this price, the lobby is formed. Below it, it does not.
In the preceding discussion, in demonstrating the possibility that unilateral liberalization by
a large country may induce reciprocity by its partner, we have made a number of explicit
and implicit assumptions. The unilaterally liberalizing country was assumed to be large
enough to aﬀect world prices and, indeed reciprocal liberalization was shown to obtain only
when tariﬀ liberalization drove the world price p∗ above the threshold level, p (which, it may
be noted, need not happen even with full liberalization by the large country). Further, in
order for there to be some connection between export and import lobbies (crucial for the
mechanism we have proposed), it was assumed that lobbies are large enough (i.e., that α is
big enough) for lobby owners to care about the prices of goods they consume − although, as
we have discussed before, this will be the case even if each lobby was small but used output
from the other sector as an intermediate in its own production. A suﬃciency condition
regarding export supply elasticities was also stated and assumed to hold (and its empirical
plausibility discussed). Finally, our analysis focused on the case where an active import lobby
exists in the small country but there is no export lobby present. However, given (21), we can
now discuss why our initial assumption regarding the pre-existence of the import-competing
lobby rather than the exporting lobby is not crucial (see also section VI for a detailed
discussion of alternate possibilities that emerge with diﬀerent initial conditions): Taking the
other group as organized, the net beneﬁt from organizing for any group of speciﬁc factor
owners is proportional to the total deadweight loss caused prior to its entry as an organized
24group. When the export sector is the only organized group, the deadweight loss created by
this sector is increasing in the world price of the exportable as the per unit export subsidy
increases with the world price of the exportable. This makes the net beneﬁt from organizing
for the second group (the import-competing lobby) increasing in the world price of the non-
numeraire exportable. This means that at a high enough world export price, we cannot have
a single lobby equilibrium. In other words, if in the ﬁrst stage, both groups decide on lobby
formation simultaneously, we can only have a free-trade political economy equilibrium in the
small open economy at a high enough export price (see section VI).29,30
V. A Large Open Economy Facing A Large Number Of Small Open
Economies
How might the large country beneﬁt from such a political-economy dynamic? Clearly, the
(induced) movement of any single small country to free trade does not aﬀect world prices
and its liberalization of its trade regime is of little consequence to the large country. In
keeping with one of our central motivating examples (discussed in the introduction) - the
liberalization of the countries in North against each other and consequently (via GATT non-
discrimination) against the small southern economies − we analyze circumstances under
which the large country (the North) may nevertheless beneﬁt from the induced reciprocity
in its small trading partners.
29It should be noted that although the per unit export tax in the small open economy increases with an
increase in the world exportable price, this is not true about the ad valorem export tax, as can be seen from
the equilibrium export tax expressions. For example, with a constant price elasticity of export supply, we
have an ad valorem export tax that is decreasing in p∗. When we have linear demand and supply with
the additional requirement that the supply passes through the origin, the ad valorem export tax remains
constant. When this supply has a positive price intercept, the ad valorem tax is again decreasing in p∗.
30If the initial situation was one where no lobbies were organized, it is possible that a unilateral reduction
in tariﬀs by the large country induces a single lobby to form - thus taking the small country away from its
initial free trade regime. However, further reductions in tariﬀs should lead to the formation of the second
lobby taking the small economy back to free trade.
25Speciﬁcally, we now consider a large open economy, A, trading with a continuum of small
open economies. These small open economies are identical to each other with respect to
technology, endowments and tastes and preferences. Let us call the entire mass of small
open economies B. Let the total measure of this continuum be S. B’s export (import) non-
numeraire good e (good m) is A’s import (export) non-numeraire good. We assume also that
the general structure of the “large” economy is similar to that of the small open economies
with which it trades (even though it may diﬀer from them in endowments and possibly the
precise technologies used and in its exact preferences): Its consumers have quasi-linear and
additively separable utility as in (1). It produces goods xm and xe using CRS technologies and
employing sector speciﬁc capital and mobile labor and the numeraire good using Ricardian
technology (just as in the small open economies).
Let β denote the fraction of countries of type B in which both the import competing lobbies
and the exporting lobbies are organized. Let p∗
e(p∗
m) be the world equilibrium price of good
e (good m). Let t∗ be A’s ad valorem import tariﬀ rate on e. We assume that the structure
of each of the small open economies is the same as that of the small open economy in the
previous section. We assume that A exogenously cuts (sets) its import tariﬀ and in each
of the small open economies, trade policy is set using political economy considerations as
in Grossman-Helpman (1994). We will later determine A’s optimal tariﬀ in this framework.
As shown in the previous section, in a small open economy, the net beneﬁt from organizing
for the export sector when the import competing sector is already organized is given by
NB =( a + 1)(∆m +∆ e) (24)
Let us ﬁrst look at what a tariﬀ reduction in A does to the incentives of the export interests
to organize in a particular small open economy given the existence of an import lobby
there and holding ﬁxed β. Noting that in any country with an unorganized export lobby,
the deadweight loss in the exportable sector can simply be expressed as a function of the
26exportable price 31 and that the price of the exportable good is itself a function of A’s tariﬀ
rate and β, we have,
∂NB







dt∗ ] < 0 (25)
Next we look at how these incentives change as export sectors in more and more small open
economies get organized. In other words, we look at the incentives for an export sector in a
small open economy to get organized taking as given the fraction β of the total mass of small
open economies in which their respective non-numeraire sectors are organized and then look
at how these incentives change as β increases. We have,
dNB
dβ

















where the derivatives of the world prices with respect to β take into account both its direct
eﬀect and the indirect eﬀect on these prices through the “political economy” responses of
the remaining “un-liberalized” small economies.
Signing the terms on the right hand side of (26) is done as follows: The ﬁrst term on the
right hand side is positive, since the per unit tariﬀ goes up when the importable price goes
up as a result of the rise in β. This implies that the sector’s dead weight loss also goes up.32
The second term is negative since the exportable price goes down as a larger fraction of the
31In general, the deadweight loss would be a function of the export tax rate as well - but this can be
dropped here since the export tax itself is endogenous to the price of the exportable good.
32This should be true (i.e., the ﬁrst term is positive) as long as import demand is not too convex with
respect to price. If the import demand is actually very convex, the ﬁrst term would also be negative and all
the analysis will be identical to case I.
27small open economies liberalize and as explained in the previous section, the associated dead
weight loss would go up.
Due to the presence of the numeraire sector which is Ricardian and captures all the income
eﬀects in the additively separable, quasi-linear utility function, B can have greater market
power in the world market for one non-numeraire good than in that for the other, thereby
enabling a case by case analysis as follows.
Case I: B is large in the world market for e and is small in the world market for m.
In this case, the second term in the previous equation dominates the ﬁrst, so that NB is
downward sloping with respect to β . This is shown in Figure IV. The NB curve shifts up
as t∗ falls. The equilibrium fraction of the small open economies that liberalize is β∗ given
by the intersection of the NB and the F curves.33 It is easy to see that β∗ goes up as t∗
falls. In other words, as the large open economy reduces its tariﬀ, more and more small open
economies liberalize. To see this think of the initial equilibrium as being at the point where
the net beneﬁt curve corresponding to tariﬀ level t1 intersects the ﬁxed cost line denoted
by F. If A’s tariﬀ is lowered to t2, then the net beneﬁt curve shifts up as shown. For the β
given by the initial equilibrium, net beneﬁts now exceed the ﬁxed costs and export lobbies
are formed in more countries. Net beneﬁts are higher than ﬁxed costs all the way until the
point where the new net beneﬁt curve intersects the ﬁxed cost line F. Here, we have a higher
33Of course, since all the small open economies are identical in structure, it is not possible to identify
exactly which of these will have their export sectors organized. All we can analyze are the eﬀects of diﬀerent
parameters on the “fraction” of these small open economies where the export sector will be organized and
therefore, that undergo trade liberalization. However, if heterogeneity among these small open economies is
introduced along one dimension at a time, one can identify which of the small open economies will organize.
For example if organization costs diﬀer across these economies, then economies which have ﬁxed costs of
export lobby formation below a certain cut oﬀ level will declare free trade with rest of the world and the
ones above will not have free trade. Similarly, if these economies diﬀer only in terms of their export capital
stock, then there is going to be a cut oﬀ level of this capital. Small open economies which have export capital
above this level will declare free trade.
28equilibrium level of β. At very high levels of A’s tariﬀ, no small open economy would have
liberalized, while at very low levels, all of them would have.
Case II: B is large in the world market for m and small in the world market for e.
In this case, the ﬁrst term in the previous equation dominates the second term (which is
zero), so that NB is upward sloping with respect to β. This is shown in Figure V. The
NB curve shifts up as t∗ falls. The determination of equilibrium levels of β is slightly more
complicated than in the previous case. For intermediate values of t∗, we can see that there
are multiple equilibria - either all the small open economies have liberalized or none of them
has liberalized. The point where the NB curve intersects the F line is clearly unstable.
However, for extreme values of A’s tariﬀ, the results are the same as in case I. When t∗ falls
to a suﬃciently low level, the entire NB curve is above F and all of the small countries have
export lobbies and liberalize their trade regimes. This is the only equilibrium when t∗ is
very low.
Case III: B is large in both markets.
In this case, we are not able to say which of the two terms in the previous equation dominates,
so that the shape of NB with respect to β cannot be unambiguously determined. However,
for extreme values of A’s tariﬀ, the results would qualitatively be the same as in cases I and
II. Therefore, all small open economies would still liberalize when A’s tariﬀ is very low, since
then the NB curve could entirely be above F.
From the preceding analysis, we conclude that for large enough reductions in tariﬀs by the
large country, reciprocal liberalization by the small open economies is likely. We now turn
to the analysis of optimal tariﬀs for the large country.
29VI. The Large Open Economy’s Optimal Tariﬀ
Having described, in the previous section, the political economy processes that would be set
in motion with a unilateral liberalization by a large open economy trading with a number of
small open economies, we now wish to investigate the implications of this for optimal (welfare
maximizing) tariﬀs for the large country.34 Two points must be noted: We should note that
we continue to assume that the general structure of the “large” economy is similar to that
of the small open economies with which it trades (even though it may diﬀer from them in
its endowments and possibly the precise technologies used and in its exact preferences): Its
consumers have quasi-linear and additively separable utility as in (1) and it produces goods
xm and xe using CRS technologies and employing sector speciﬁc capital and mobile labor
and the numeraire good using Ricardian technology (just as in the small open economies).
Additionally, for the discussion that follows, we only allow the country the use of one trade
instrument: an import tariﬀ.
Let W be the welfare of the large open economy. This can be expressed as a function of the
large country’s tariﬀ t∗ and β. β in turn is negatively related to t∗ as we have argued in
Section V.35 Two situations may be contrasted:
(a)The large country chooses its tariﬀs taking the lobby structure in the rest of the world
as ﬁxed and where the lobbies in the small open economies, B, are formed taking the large
country’s tariﬀ as given (i.e., with simultaneous moves) and
(b) The large country moves ﬁrst, pre-committing to its tariﬀ level, taking its eﬀect on
34The welfare maximizing nature of the large country here is simply illustrative - our analysis of what the
optimal tariﬀs should be holds independently of the actual process driving tariﬀ determination in this large
economy - be it welfare maximization or something else. Assuming welfare maximization here allows us to
make the normative point that this section is devoted to.
35Note that this has to at least be true locally at a stable interior equilibrium. Here, it must be that the




Both the numerator and the denominator are less than zero, thus giving us that β0 < 0.
30lobby formation in the home country into account (i.e. where the large country leads in
Stackelberg-like fashion).
Thus, the timing of moves is as follows (See also Appendix A.5.): In the former (simultaneous
moves) case, ﬁrst, the large country’s tariﬀ and lobby structure in the small open economies
are determined simultaneously, each taking the other as ﬁxed. Then, in the next stage, the
domestic trade policy vector is determined in the small open economies. In contrast, in the
latter (Stackelberg) case, ﬁrst the tariﬀ choice is made by the large country and in the next
stage lobbies in B are determined. Trade policies in B are determined in a ﬁnal (third) stage.
The only diﬀerence between the former and latter cases then is the fact that the latter case
permits the large country to set tariﬀs taking into account the fact that its tariﬀ will have
implications for lobby formation decisions in the small open economies.
Thus, when we think of the simultaneous interaction between the large country and the small
countries, we could think of the large country maximizing its welfare for a given level of β,
so that we have t∗ =1 /￿. where ￿ denotes the elasticity of export supply from B, (where the
elasticity takes into account the fact that varying tariﬀ levels for the tariﬀ of the large open
economy would result in varying levels of tariﬀs in B). This elasticity in turn depends on t∗
and β. Therefore, this gives us the large country’s reaction function, which takes the form
t∗ = t∗(β). We know the rest of the world’s reaction function β = β(t∗),β 0 < 0. The point
of intersection between the two reaction functions gives us the (Nash) equilibrium levels of
tariﬀ t∗ and fraction of small countries liberalized β. Let us call these levels t∗
n and
β(t∗
n). In this equilibrium, beliefs and actions are consistent. In other words, the tariﬀ level
the small countries believe the large country will set is actually what it sets and similarly the
β the large country believes will prevail is actually what is realized. So, the large country
does not take into account the fact that by moving ﬁrst (relative to lobby formation in the
partner countries) and credibly setting a certain tariﬀ, it can aﬀect the actual β. When
31this is done instead, we have the large country acting as a Stackelberg leader in the sense
that it can move ﬁrst and pre-commit to a certain tariﬀ taking into account the eﬀect of its
tariﬀ on the level of β. We now prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4
The large country’s optimal (i.e., welfare maximizing) tariﬀ is smaller when it
takes into account its eﬀect on the incentives for lobby formation in its partner
countries than when it takes the lobby structure in the partner countries as given.





This gives us the following ﬁrst-order condition:
W1 + W2β
0(t
∗) = 0 (27)
Note that W2 β0(t∗) is always negative since, clearly, W2 > 0 and β0 < 0. Therefore, W1
has to be positive for the above equality to hold. Let us write the above equation (27) as
ψ(t∗)=0 . The solution to this equation gives us the large country’s optimal tariﬀ when
it acts as a leader. Let this solution be t∗
s. If we actually plug in t∗
n into ψ(.), this
function would be negative, as W1 = 0 at the Nash level. Using the second-order concavity
condition, ψ0 < 0 , it is easy to see that t∗
s <t ∗
n to make ψ = 0. This proves the
proposition.
To see this in greater detail, we let p∗
e(p∗
m) be the world equilibrium price of good e (good

















32where MA is country A’s import demand for good e as a function of the domestic price
and M0
A is the derivative of this function with respect to the domestic price of e in A.














while EB is B0s export supply as a function of the world price at a given β and E0
B is the
derivative of EB with respect to p∗
e at a given β. Using (28) and (29) and again equating













∗￿ − 1] (30)
Of course, W1 = 0 implies t∗
n =1 /￿ where ￿ = p∗
e(E0
B/EB), where the export supply
curve for B is itself a function of A’s import tariﬀs.
W1 + W2β
0(t










W2 > 0,β0 < 0,(∂p∗
e/∂t∗) < 0 which imply that the ﬁrst term in the above equation is
negative. (31) thus shows that the optimal tariﬀ is lower when the large country takes into
account its eﬀect on the lobby structure in the home country.
VII. Simulations
Thus far, our argument regarding reciprocated unilateralism has been discussed in the con-
text of particular (and, as we shall argue further below, empirically relevant) initial condi-
tions. Speciﬁcally, the argument has been developed in the context of a small trading part-
ner whose trade policy has been distorted due the exclusive initial presence of an import-
33competing lobby. A question arises here as to what happens under other diﬀerent initial
conditions. That is to say, what will be the eﬀect of unilateral tariﬀ liberalization by the
large country if no lobbies are present in the small country initially? Or if it is an export
lobby rather than an import lobby that is initially present? The complexity of the theoretical
framework and multitude of parameters involved make analytical solutions to these questions
hard to obtain and assess. However, simulation analysis using alternative functional forms
and parameter values (treating the political organization decision of both the export and the
import-competing lobby as endogenous) provides us with guidance on this issue. We discuss
our ﬁndings below.
Our discussion of our ﬁndings using simulation analysis focuses on two illustrative cases. In
both, demand functions and production functions are assumed to be linear and symmetric
across sectors (see Appendix A.6. for details). We develop some additional notation as
follows. FNB i()=NB − F denotes the full net beneﬁt (beneﬁt from organizing net
of contributions and ﬁxed costs) with the subscript i = m,e indicating the sector whose
full net beneﬁt function it is. Included within the parentheses are all the sectors which are
organized once the sector under consideration gets organized (for example, FNB e(e) denotes
the full net beneﬁt to the export sector from forming its lobby when the import-competing
lobby is not organized, and FNB e(m,e) denotes the full net beneﬁts to the export sector
from lobby formation when the import-competing sector is organized as well). To see the
eﬀects of unilateral tariﬀ reductions by the large country, we hold the import price of the
small open economy constant at unity and vary the export price, p∗.
In our ﬁrst case (Figure VI), our small open economy is assumed to have an endowment of
capital (sector speciﬁc) in the exportable sector that is twice the amount of capital in the
import-competing sector. As we have maintained throughout this analysis, individuals in
this economy are assumed to own capital in identical amounts and in one or the other of
34the two sectors (but not both). Assuming further that the ﬁxed cost of lobby organization,
F, is proportional to the number of capital owners in a sector, we take the ﬁxed cost of
political organization in the export sector to be twice that in the import-competing sector.
Figure VI presents the full net beneﬁt curves as a function of the export price faced by
the small open economy. The slopes of the full net beneﬁt curves are positive for reasons
that have already been discussed earlier in this paper. We can see from Figure VI that for
low values of the export price, we have a unique equilibrium with just the import sector
organized. As the export price rises, this initially continues to be the unique equilibrium
− the FNB curves for the export sector (taking the import sector to be organized or not)
are both below zero and the FNB curves for the import sector are both above zero. After
FNB e(m,e) rises above zero with yet higher p∗, the export lobby gets formed and the unique
equilibrium here involves the formation of both lobbies (with free trade as the trade policy
outcome) since FNB curves for both lobbies, each taking the other as organized, are above
zero. This scenario is consistent with the one that we have focused on in the paper so far
and illustrates our main argument. Note, however, that if ﬁxed costs were a bit higher in
the import-competing sector, both the FNB m curves would shift down uniformly and, at
low values of p∗, the import-competing sector would not be organized. If this were the initial
condition, a reduction in tariﬀs by the large country would now induce the import-competing
lobby to form ﬁrst − a change in economic circumstances that would be welfare decreasing
since agents in the small economy will have moved from an eﬃcient trade regime (with free
trade) to an ineﬃcient one having incurred additionally the ﬁxed costs of lobby formation.
This may appear as damaging to the argument regarding the use of unilateralism to induce
reciprocity, but this is not the case since, of course, the argument is only relevant when
there are some tariﬀs being imposed by the partner country in the ﬁrst place. Also, with
further tariﬀ reductions (i.e., increases in the world price, p∗), the export lobby gets formed
as well (after FNB e goes above zero) and we have free trade. Thus, with high enough tariﬀ
35reductions by the large country, free trade obtains in the partner country (even if the path
to this is non-monotonic and ﬁxed costs of lobby organization have been incurred along the
way).
In our second case, we continue to assume that the endowment of capital in the exportable
sector is twice than in the importable sector. However, ﬁxed costs of lobby organization for
the export sector are assumed to be lower than that in the importable sector. As shown in
Figure VII, this gives us FNB curves for the exportable that are higher than those in the
importable sector. Note that, as drawn, at low levels of p∗, it is now the export lobby that
is organized while the import lobby is not. Trade policy is initially distorted with export
subsidies and import subsidies. While it should be clear that this is an empirically nearly
irrelevant case as virtually no countries can be characterized as having trade regimes of this
nature, it is a clear theoretical possibility and so we analyze this nonetheless. Here too, a
high enough increase in the world price of the exportable results in the formation of the
import lobby with free trade emerging as the policy outcome. While such an outcome would
beneﬁt the small country (if the welfare gain from the move to the undistorted policy regime
outweighed the ﬁxed costs of lobby formation), the large country would be faced with a
policy regime less favorable to it. Finally, if ﬁxed costs were a little higher, there would be
no lobbies at low values of p∗. An increase in p∗ would ﬁrst lead to the formation of an
export lobby which would be welfare worsening for the small country, causing it to move
from free trade to a trade regime that was more favorable to the large country. Of course,
further increases in p∗, as shown, will cause the formation of the import lobby as well and a
movement back to free trade.36
36We should note another interesting possibility that emerges in the setting just discussed. When only the
import lobby is organized initially, an increase in tariﬀs by the large country also reduces the beneﬁt to the
import lobby of being active, as the FNB proﬁles show. To the extent that ﬁxed costs of lobby organization
are paid period by period, this suggests that tariﬀ increases by the large country may also move the small
country to free trade (if the import lobby drops out). However, if lobby organization costs are fully sunk,
there will always be an incentive for the import sector to lobby (however small). The possibility of unilateral
36Finally, we should note that, for particular parameter values, other possibilities than those
discussed in the two cases above arise as well. Speciﬁcally, with increases in p∗, it may be
that we enter an intermediate zone where multiple equilibria are possible. Thus, the position
of the FNB curves may be such that each lobby has an incentive to get organized only if the
other lobby does as well. The outcome could then either be that both lobbies get organized
or that neither does (with free trade as the policy outcome either way). In these cases too,
however, it can be seen that with large enough values of p∗ both lobbies get organized −
The simulations exercises, which examine a variety of “initial conditions,” leave us with the
following conclusions. First, the argument regarding reciprocated unilateralism has norma-
tive relevance primarily in contexts where the unilaterally liberalizing country faces countries
that impose restrictions on its exports. Second, suﬃciently large unilaterally tariﬀ reductions
lead to free trade in the partner countries regardless of the initial conditions.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions
Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariﬀs pioneered by Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) and allowing for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, as in
Mitra (1999), this paper analyzes the potential for unilateral trade liberalization by one
country to impact trade policies in its partner in the absence of any formal agreement or
communication between these countries.
We consider a large country trading with a small partner in which initially an organized
import-competing lobby exists and where the trade regime is characterized by import tariﬀs
(and export taxes). In this context, we ﬁnd that unilateral liberalization by the large country
will induce reciprocal tariﬀ reductions by altering the political economy equilibrium there.
Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by the large country has the eﬀect of increasing the
increases in tariﬀs by the large country leading to free trade in the partner then disappears.
37incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby eﬀectively
against the import-competing lobbies there for lower protection. Using simulation analysis,
we conﬁrm that large enough tariﬀ reductions by the large country will induce the small
country to move towards free trade even under quiet diﬀerent initial conditions than the
ones considered above (although the path towards free trade may not always be monotonic,
as we have discussed in section VII).
The induced reciprocity mechanism we have discussed has potentially important normative
implications. Optimal tariﬀs that anticipate such reciprocity in partners may be lower than
those calculated ignoring this reciprocity mechanism.
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A.1. To prove: dT
dp∗ > 0.
Proof: From(15) and (16), when only the import-competing sector is organized, the ad












where Im(pm) is import demand and −Ie(pe) is export supply. Normalizing p∗
m = 1 and
letting p∗











We impose the restriction that an increase in the price of a commodity should increase the
output supplied proportionally more than it increases the magnitude of the derivative of
export supply with respect to price, so that g0 > 0. This would always hold for linear
demand and supply functions and also for most standard demand and supply functions.





A.2. Suﬃcient Condition for ∂∆e
∂p∗ > 0,E00
S(p) ≥ 0




p∗−T ES(p)dp − TE S(p∗ − T)
= IES(p∗) − IES(p∗ − T) − TE S(p∗ − T)
39where I stands for integral evaluated at a particular value.
∆2(T,p∗)=ES(p∗) − ES(p∗ − T) − TE0
S(p∗ − T)
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ES(p∗) − ES(p∗ − T)
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which in turn implies that ∆2 ≥ 0.





=[ ES(p∗ − T) − ES(p∗ − T)+TE0
S(p∗ − T)] dT
dp∗



















We know that E00
S ≥ 0 is a suﬃcient condition for d∆
dp∗ > 0, since it makes the second term
≥ 0. With E00
S < 0, the second term is negative. However, we can still have d∆
dp∗ > 0a s
long as the ﬁrst-term dominates the second. In other words, we only need the total on the
40right hand side of the above expression to be > 0 as a necessary and suﬃcient condition for
d∆
dp∗ > 0. This is less restrictive then E00
S ≥ 0 which is a suﬃcient condition.
A.3. Export Supply Elasticities




Es(p) and requiring it to be non-negative, i.e., requiring, Es
00 ≥ 0,
in turn requires that ￿s
p [￿s − 1] + ∂￿s
∂p ≥ 0,




∂p ≥− [￿s − 1]. Note that with constant export supply
elasticities, this translates into the requirement that ￿s ≥ 1. For non-constant export supply
elasticity, Es
00 ≥ 0 requires that the elasticity of the elasticity of export supply not be too
negative when ￿s ≥ 1 and that it be above a certain positive value, 1 − ￿s, when ￿s < 1.








where ￿x and ￿c denote absolute values of the elasticity of domestic output supply and demand
for the exportable good. It is easy to see that ￿s ≥ 1 would hold with most reasonable values
of the domestic supply and demand elasticities and ratios of consumption to production of
this good. Indeed, for the converse to be true, one would need to have very low elasticities of
domestic demand and supply of the exportable and very small ratios of domestic consumption
relative to output.
A.4.
Let pe and pm be the domestic prices of the export and import goods respectively.
When only the import sector is organized, the government maximizes the following objective
41function with respect to pe and pm:
Ωm(pe,p m,p ∗)+aΩA(pe,p m,p ∗)
=( a + 1)Ωm(pe,p m,p ∗)+aΩe(pe,p m,p ∗)
=( a +1 ) πm(pm)+aπe(pe)+( a + θ)[CTm(pm)+CTe(pe,p ∗)] + (a + θ)Nl, where CTi
is consumer surplus plus tax revenue generated by sector i, while πi is proﬁt accruing to
sector i.
From the above maximization exercise, we have the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
(I)( a +1 ) π
0





e(pe)+( a + θ)CTe1(pe,p
∗)=0
where the subscript “1” denotes the partial derivative with respect to the ﬁrst argument.
The equilibrium welfare level of the export group when only the import-competing sector is
organized is given by ˜ Ωe
m(p∗)=πe(˜ pe)+( 1− θ)[CTe(˜ pe,p ∗)+CTm(˜ pm)] where ˜ pi is the
equilibrium domestic price of good i when only the import-competing sector is organized.






e(˜ pe)+( 1− θ)CTe1(˜ pe,p
∗)]
d˜ pe
dp∗ +( 1− θ)CTe2(˜ pe,p
∗)
where the subscripts “1” and “2” denote partial derivatives with respect to the ﬁrst and
second arguments respectively.
From (II), we have CTe1(˜ pe,p ∗)= −a
a+θπ0




















(1+g0) > 0 where g(·) is deﬁned as before in
the appendix.
CTe = CSe + TR e(pe,p
∗)=CSe(pe)+( p
∗ − pe)[xe(pe) − De(pe)]
42where CSe and TR e are consumer surplus and export tax revenue respectively generated
by the export sector and De is the domestic demand for the export good.
Therefore, we have CTe2 =[ xe(pe) − De(pe)] > 0. Hence, ˜ Ωe0
m(p∗) > 0 which means that
the welfare of the export sector when unorganized in the presence of an organized import-
competing sector is increasing with respect to the world export price. This is shown by the
positive slope of this graph in Figure III. ˜ Ωe0
m,e − ˜ C0(p∗)= ˜ Ωe0
m(p∗)+( a +1 )d∆e
dp∗ > ˜ Ωe0
m. Also
˜ Ωe
m,e(p∗) − ˜ C(p∗)= ˜ Ωe
m(p∗)+( a + 1)(∆e +∆ m) > ˜ Ωe
m(p∗). This, in turn, means that when
organized the welfare of the export group, net of political contributions but gross of ﬁxed
costs is both higher and more steeply sloped that its welfare when its is not organized (see
Figure III). With ﬁxed costs large enough, the welfare of the organized export group both
net of ﬁxed costs and political contributions will be below the unorganized welfare curve for
low values of p∗, but above it for high values.
A.5. Derivation of (28), (29), (30) and (31).
The various stages under the two situations (Simultaneous Moves and Stackelberg) are given
by
Simultaneous Move Stackelberg
Stage 1: t∗ is chosen by A Stage 1: t∗ is chosen by A
and lobbies in B are
determined simultaneously
Stage 2: The domestic trade taxes Stage 2: Lobbies in B are
and subsidies are determined determined
in B
Stage 3: Trade Policy is determined in B
43Given quasi-linear utility, aggregate welfare in country A can be given as
WA = We + Wm + YL
where
We : consumer surplus (CS) + producer surplus (PS) + trade tax revenue (TR) generated by
the “e” sector (country A’s importable sector, i.e., B’s exportable) in country A
Wm : CS + PS+ TR generated by the “m” sector in country A
YL : Labor income



















De : country A’s dd for “e”
Xe : country A’s ss for “e”
This can be re-written as:




























∂t∗]+[ De − Xe][p∗













The above expression is Equation (28) in the text.
Note that,
MA = De − Xe




















































































This is Equation (30) in the text. Noting that Import demand = export supply, we have:
MA = EB














From (27), we have:






∂t∗ MA{t∗￿ − 1} + W2β0(t∗)=0




















The above expression is simply equation (31) in the text. The export supply function of
β here is a function of p∗ and β. The eﬀect of p∗ here incorporates the direct eﬀect
of p∗ on export supply as well as the indirect eﬀect through its eﬀect on the export tax
in the “β” small open economies for a given β. One should note here that the political
economy equilibrium domestic price of the export sector (given the number of lobbies) is
always increasing the world price p∗
e. 37
37It is important to note throughout that E0
S here is ∂ES
∂p∗
e (p∗
e,β). In other words, β is held constant.
However, the political economy reactions of countries in B is taken into account.
46A.6.
To conduct the simulation analysis, we make the following assumptions regarding supply
and demand functions in the small economy: Total endowment of the export-speciﬁc capital
in the economy is assumed to be twice that of the import-competing speciﬁc factor. The
production functions of the two goods are assumed to be the same, so that, taking into
account the endowment diﬀerence, we can write the supply functions of the exportable and
import-competing goods respectively as xe =2 ∗pe and xm = pm. We also write the aggregate
domestic demands as Ae − pe and Am − pm.
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Figure  II: Net Benefits from Lobby Formation and Trade Taxes vs P*
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Figure VII: FNB = NB - F (Theta = 1/3, a = 10, F(export) = 0.015, 













 Figure VIII: Export Supply Curve  
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